Follow Me, Says Crane

We have previously reported on a proposed ballot initiative on public pensions in California that, as written, would cover UC.  There appears to be money behind the campaign for this initiative.  Another indication of such money comes in the form of a letter by former UC Regent David Crane on CalSTRS.  Crane was appointed by Gov. Schwarzenegger but the appointment was not endorsed by the state senate and thus ended. 

In any event, the letter from Crane addressed to Gov. Brown – which his website says in today’s Sacramento Bee – seems to be part of the larger campaign for the initiative.  It was circulated on the website of (and by emails from) a group associated with Crane – Govern for California:  [excerpt]

…Governor, it’s long past time to act. By not addressing CalSTRS, California has already become the largest “deadbeat” state government, a term coined by The New Yorker to characterize governments not even paying minimally required pension contributions. Every day of additional delay adds millions of dollars to the next generation’s burden. If you don’t act, you are effectively defunding their classrooms, cutting their public services, and raising their taxes…

You can find the full letter at:
http://hosted.verticalresponse.com/990407/ff4a77211d/1660549029/358ab184e1/
or
http://www.governforcalifornia.org/an-open-letter-to-governor-jerry-brown/

Oddly, a search in today’s Bee (under Crane, CalSTRS, opinion, viewpoint, letters to the editor, etc.) did not find the letter.  It did find other earlier Crane-related items.  Among them was a recent article indicating Crane was involving himself in state legislative contests related to his pension interests.  See:

http://www.sacbee.com/2014/01/03/6045328/pension-activists-back-democrat.html

As we have noted in past postings, the chief UC interest in this matter is to be excluded from the proposed initiative and to leave funding of the UC pension to the university and (current) Regents.

UPDATE: Crane in a later post on Fox and Hounds no longer claims the letter appeared in the Bee.  See http://www.foxandhoundsdaily.com/2014/01/political-leaders-must-focus-calstrs-funding-crisis/

 

Audio of Legislative Hearing on Public Pensions


Audio of Dec. 1, 2011 hearing by the legislative Conference Committee on Public Employee Pensions on Gov. Jerry Brown’s proposals for state and local public pensions in California.

Click on link above. If you don’t want to listen to the full four and a half hours, scroll towards the bottom to hear the governor’s testimony and UC’s testimony.

Testimony by representatives of the Dept. of Finance, the Legislative Analyst’s Office, Gov. Jerry Brown in person, CalPERS, CalSTRS, State Assn. of County Retirement Systems, University of California pension system, Employer groups (League of California Cities, California State Assn. of Counties, California Special Districts), Employee union groups (CTA, California School Employees Assn., Professional Engineers & Scientists, AFSCME, Peace Officers Research Assn.), Public Comments. See earlier post for agenda of this hearing. Gov. Brown was not on the original agenda.

Dept. of Finance: The governor’s 50-50 sharing of contributions idea refers to the normal cost, not the unfunded liability. The 75% notion is not a cap but a kind of goal. There was vague reference to a dollar cap. But much was unclear. It was said that the Dept. of Finance would be hiring a consultant to work out details. There would be a minimum early retirement age but it is not clear what that will be. There was an allusion to a 6-month period to get an actual hybrid plan in shape. There was some discussion of legal issues surrounding “impairment of contracts” but again there was fuzziness. It came up in the context of what the governor wanted to put on the ballot in the way of constitutional changes. The only clear cut response was that it would be necessary for voters to approve changes in the CalPERS board.

Legislative Analyst’s Office (Jason Sisney): Noted there are thousands of pension plans and occupations so putting together a plan will be complicated. There was reference to the total compensation idea (if you cut pensions, other forms of compensation may need to rise so the savings may be offset). The details are not yet in the governor’s plan. Legal doubts raised about changes for current employees, even changes in contributions. Recommended not fiddling with current workers. Thus, changes would be for new hires so there would be little short term savings. Specifically cautioned about high paid workers and need to be competitive, particularly university professors who are recruited in a national market.

Gov. Brown: Philosophized about debt, Greek financial crisis, Europe. At one point, referring to a statement by CalPERS that freezing its plan would cut off incoming contributions from new hires, said that seemed like a Ponzi scheme. That is, if a plan depended on new people coming in, it sounded like a Ponzi scheme. This remark could be a media sound bite. Told the Democrats that there will be taxes on the ballot they would like voters to pass but unless there is a pension reform also on the ballot, the taxes won’t pass. So there needs to be compromise, balance, etc.

Note: The Ponzi scheme quote has already hit the news:

http://blogs.kqed.org/capitalnotes/2011/12/01/browns-pension-musings-from-ponzi-to-castor-oil/

CalPERS: Prefers pure defined benefit to hybrid of defined benefit and defined contribution. The latter is more expensive to administer and will earn less. Said the proposed ban on contribution holidays when plans become overfunded could violate tax rules and lead to loss of tax-exempt status. Tried to respond to governor’s Ponzi comment without using the word Ponzi. Said what was meant was that if a pension plan such as CalPERS is frozen (closed), it no longer gets cash from new hires and it needs cash for paying benefits. Need for cash flow would cause it to invest in assets that throw off a lot of cash and therefore have lower rates of return. The answer was not great since if the plan were really 100% funded, you could in theory freeze it and pay off the obligations. CalPERS problem (and the reason for the governor’s proposal) is largely a matter of unfunded liabilities.

CalSTRS: CalSTRS is recognized as the most problematic state plan. Spokesperson noted that the governor’s plan doesn’t deal with CalSTRS’ unfunded liability. Complained about fuzziness in governor’s plan as to who pays for the defined contribution component. But polite language that the governor’s plan was a good “starting point.”

County Systems: Noted that there were many plans. They are already negotiating two-tier arrangements and other features such as increased contributions similar to the governor’s plan. Doubts raised about hybrid proposal. Total compensation point made (if you cut pensions, you have to raise something else).

University of California: (Nathan Brostrom and Gary Schlimgen) Some history of the UC system. Discussed the two-decade contribution holiday. The other sources of funding are paying but not the state. Regents have been ramping up contributions but must pay for state share out of operating budget funds. Defined benefit model helps retain mid-career faculty but encourages retirement so that there is faculty renewal at older ages. Discussion of Regents’ pension changes of 2010 after PEB report. Many features of the governor’s plan have already been adopted by UC such as two tier. We already have 3-year HAPC to prevent spiking. UC doesn’t offer “airtime” purchases of past service unlike CalPERS. Regents are not plan members so no conflict of interest in serving as plan trustees. UC doesn’t make retroactive improvements. UC is less generous than the state on retiree health care. UC has problems with 50-50 contribution proposal for current employees. Hybrid model is problematic. 75% replacement target is too low for retention/recruitment. Some UC unions have already agreed to two tier. The constraints in the governor’s plan would make collective bargaining more difficult. UC plan has the right balance. (Note: brief break in audio stream towards end.) In Q&A period, pointed to current projection of full funding by 2039. Notes that contributions of current employees are rising as part of that projection.

Local Employer groups: There was again reference to the idea that the tax status of plans could be at risk if an overfunded plan could not have a contribution holiday.

State and Local Employee groups: No unexpected points.

Public comment: Included some external groups pushing pension reforms.

Part 1 of Gov. Brown’s testimony

Part 2 of Gov. Brown’s Testimony

Part 1: UC Testimony


Part 2: UC Testimony

The Guv on Pensions: What did he say?

Governor Brown has now held his press conference on public pensions. His proposals clearly covered CalPERS and CalSTRS. Coverage of UC was not mentioned. But the governor did make an off-hand reference to UC’s long pension holiday, i.e., the two-decade period of zero contributions.

The governor released a 12-point plan but one element, a kind of total cap on pension amounts, was not mentioned on the list of the twelve. [A cap is mentioned but not linked to defined contributions.] Yet, in response to a reporter’s question, he said a cap was intended but that it was complicated because of his proposal for a “hybrid” plan for new hires. A hybrid plan means a combination of defined benefit and defined contribution. It was vague but the governor seemed to want the likely payout from the defined contribution part of the system to be factored into the calculation of the cap. Lots of uncertainty remains in this aspect of the proposal.

Let’s assume that UC is not covered officially. Might there nonetheless be elements in the governor’s plan that would potentially push the Regents to follow suit?

The plan for new hires puts 67 as the age of normal retirement. There could be pressure on the Regents – if the plan is adopted – to set the normal retirement age in our lower-tier plan at 67.

More significantly, the governor’s proposal has as one of its points a 50-50 split in contributions to the plan; employee pays half and employer pays half. CalPERS figures suggest that right now only about one third of the contributions are from employees. So 50-50 would be a significant bump up in employee contributions under CalPERS. And the higher contribution applies to ALL employees, not just new hires. The Academic Senate’s position has been that the employee contribution should be no more than 7%. Seven percent, or even the 8% that has figured in some discussions, would not be half of the long-term contributions planned for UC.

Another concept that might raise pressure for emulation by UC is the idea – mentioned by the governor in the news conference – that career retirees should have an income equal to 75% of final salary with one-third coming from each of Social Security, defined benefit, and defined contribution. Exactly how this would be applied and how it would mesh with a cap is unclear. [It may be that the 75% is what is meant by a cap.]

It might be noted that the proposal needs legislative approval. A KPCC radio program (embedded below) after the governor’s conference featured comments by Democratic and Republican leaders in the legislature as well as yours truly. The Republican was surprisingly positive. Elements of the plan will require a vote of the people, including some restructuring of the CalPERS board. The legislature could put a proposition on the ballot, but bipartisan support would be needed to do so. In theory, a proposition could be put on the ballot via the initiative process. But initiative signature gathering requires $1-$2 million for signature gathering firms. The governor doesn’t have that kind of money lying around.

As more info becomes available, we will update you via this blog.

The press release with the 12-point plan is at: http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Twelve_Point_Pension_Reform_10.27.11.pdf

Here is the governor’s press conference:

Here is the radio interview:

Follow Up: GASB proposals could stir things up for UCRP via CalSTRS

Yesterday, we noted proposed changes in public pension accounting rules by GASB, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board. An observation from Academic Council Chair Robert Anderson, added to that blog note, indicated that the GASB proposal would not have a direct impact on UCRP. However, the problem facing UCRP is partly political.

As prior blog posts have noted, the governor is planning some kind of pension proposals – apparently requiring a ballot proposition. Such a proposition, depending on how it is worded, could sweep UCRP into a statewide change, even though the Regents enacted their own pension modifications in December 2010.

There is a report today in the Sacramento Bee that the big CalSTRS fund covering schools, whose unfunded liability is already large under current accounting rules, would experience a big jump in its recorded liability:

…The California State Teachers’ Retirement System already faces a funding gap of $56 billion – the difference between the money it expects to have on hand over the next 30 years and what it will need to pay out in benefits during the same period. The (GASB) proposal would triple the gap – on paper – to around $150 billion, said Ed Derman, deputy chief executive officer at CalSTRS…

Full article at: http://www.sacbee.com/2011/10/18/3986621/outlook-goes-from-bad-to-worse.html

Anything that raises the pension issue in the larger state pensions – CalSTRS and CalPERS – could lead indirectly to UCRP changes that go beyond what the Regents enacted. While CalPERS apparently would not be much affected by the GASB proposal, $150 billion at CalSTRS will surely stir things up.

Buried Lede on Retiree Health?


From Wiktionary

“bury the lede”

(idiomatic, US, journalism) To begin a story with details of secondary importance to the reader while postponing more essential points or facts.

http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bury_the_lede

====

An article in today’s calpensions.com indicates that both CalPERS and CalSTRS have asked GASB – the Governental Accounting Standards Board – for a delay in its proposed new rules on public pension accounting. The rule would allow public pensions such as UCRP to continue with their projections of earnings on their assets (7.5% for UCRP) but would require a much lower discount rate for unfunded liabilities. The net effect of the proposed change would boost the accounting value of unfunded liability.

Buried at the end of the report is an indication that GASB is moving towards doing the same for retiree health care. Note that at UC, as in most public systems, there essentially is no trust fund with assets for retiree health – the system is pay-as-you-go. Hence, everything is unfunded liability. The impact on reported unfunded liability for retiree health would be much bigger than for pensions.

There is also a final sentence that indicates GASB is looking at “financial projections.” It is not clear to what that phrase refers, but it sure sounds like GASB is looking at whether assumed future earnings rates on assets, e.g., 7.5% for UCRP (and higher at CalPERS and CalSTRS), are too high.

Here are the last few sentences of the article:

Other speakers at the hearing said the new accounting rules should require government employers to report their retiree health debt. The state, for example, owes an estimated $60 billion over the next 30 years for retiree health care. Like most government employers, the state has not set aside money to invest and help pay for retiree health care promised current state workers. The state is paying about $1.5 billion for retiree health care this year, a rapidly growing cost.

“I think I can offer you some hope,” …the GASB chairman, told a speaker. “Dealing with OPEB (other post-employment benefits), primarily retiree health benefits, is something that’s on our agenda. We will be looking at that going forward.”

(He) told another speaker that GASB has “another project that is looking at financial projections.”

Full article at http://calpensions.com/2011/10/17/calpers-calstrs-delay-new-accounting-rules/

UPDATE: Academic Council chair Robert Anderson adds the following note re UCRP via email (in italics below):

The actual GASB proposal for pensions is to project the liabilities year by year; then project the assets forward, including future contributions according to your actuarial plan (which you must be actually following, not just planning to do at some indefinite point in the future) and your assumed rate of return on assets and see if you ever run out of money. If you do, all liabilities beyond that point are discounted back at a lower rate, most likely a corporate bond or a taxable municipal bond rate. If not, all liabilities are discounted back at the assumed rate of return. We have an actuarial plan that restores us to full funding in 30 years, and we are currently following it, so the new GASB rule on pensions should make no difference to us.

It would make sense for (GASB) to apply that to retiree health. But note we are already discounting retiree health at (if I recall correctly) 6%, precisely because we are not prefunding it. Thus, I think there would be little change in our retiree health liability. I presume CalPERS and CalSTRS are also currently required to use the lower rate also. Thus, I am not sure it would make much difference.

In short, the impact on retiree health accounting would depend on whether GASB insisted on a rate below 6%.

Piggy-Back

Can UC piggy-back on CalSTRS? We are “education,” too. And we have pension funding issues. If you don’t ask, you surely don’t get. See below:


CalSTRS reported ready to seek more state funding

Sacramento Bee, 10/11/11, Dale Kasler

For more than two years, CalSTRS has been talking about asking state lawmakers for more money to plug its funding gap. Now the teachers’ pension fund believes the Legislature is ready to listen. Pension fund Chief Executive Jack Ehnes said last week he wants Gov. Jerry Brown to include additional CalSTRS funding in a long-awaited pension reform proposal he’s expected to release in the coming weeks. “We think we’re at the right moment where it’s time to move on the funding strategy politically,” Ehnes said at a CalSTRS board meeting in Huntington Beach, according to Bloomberg news…

Full article at http://www.sacbee.com/2011/10/11/3973771/calstrs-reported-ready-to-seek.html

LAO Writes Up Yet Another Ebenstein Pension Initiative

Readers of this blog will know that Lanny Ebenstein – who has some affiliation with UC-Santa Barbara’s Econ Dept. – seems to like to file public pension initiatives. It only costs $200 and for that you get the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) to give a summary and analysis as well as a title from the Attorney General. What a bargain!

Ebenstein has been leaving UC’s pension system out of his initiatives. His efforts refer to CalPERS and CalSTRS. But the LAO’s write ups do serve a useful purpose in pointing to the legal issues that tinkering with pensions pose. They also raise the usual issues of amateur legislating via initiative.

Here is the latest below. Key points are in bold italics:

LAO Analysis, August 19, 2011

Pursuant to Elections Code Section 9005, we have reviewed the proposed constitutional initiative regarding changes to pension benefit retirement ages for certain public sector pension systems (A.G. File No. 110022).

Background

California Has Both Statewide and Local Public Pension Plans. The two largest entities managing state or local pension systems in California are the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). Combined, CalPERS and CalSTRS serve 3.1 million members (about 8 percent of California’s population), including around 750,000 members and beneficiaries who currently receive benefit payments. Members of CalPERS include current and past employees of state government and the California State University (CSU), as well as judges and classified public school employees. In addition, hundreds of local governmental entities (including cities, counties, special districts, and county offices of education) choose to contract with CalPERS to provide pension benefits for their employees. Members of CalSTRS include current and past teachers and administrators of California’s public school and community college districts. Members of CalPERS and CalSTRS receive differing levels of pension benefits. Many CalPERS members also participate in the federal Social Security program; in general, CalSTRS members do not.

In addition to CalPERS and CalSTRS, about 80 other defined benefit state and local pension systems (such as the University of California [UC] Retirement System, the Los Angeles County Employees’ Retirement Association, and the Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System) serve about one million other Californians, including about 300,000 who currently receive benefit payments.

Defined Benefit Pensions. CalPERS and CalSTRS both provide “defined benefit” pensions to their members. Defined benefit pensions provide a specific monthly benefit after retirement that is generally based on the employee’s age at retirement, years of service, salary at or near the end of his or her career, and type of work assignment. Defined benefit pensions are one part of public employees’ total compensation, along with salaries, health benefits, and other employment benefits. In general, both public employees and their employers (and, in the case of CalSTRS, the state government as well) contribute to public retirement systems to finance future pension benefits during the employees’ working years. Public pension systems invest these contributions to generate returns that, over time, pay for a significant portion of these pension benefits. The pensions of CalSTRS members are established in state law—specifically, in the state’s Education Code—and generally are not the subject of local negotiations between districts and teachers’ unions. The pensions of CalPERS members also are established in state law—generally, in the state’s Government Code—with some aspects of state or local employee pensions delineated in memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or labor contracts with unionized public employees’ bargaining units.

Typical Retirement Age. In most cases, public employees with several years of service become eligible for a pension benefit at age 50—even though the employee may be able to earn a greater pension benefit if he or she delays retirement until a later age. In CalPERS and CalSTRS, the average state or local employee retires at about age 60… Due in part to recent changes in benefits for newly hired state employees and some local employees in CalPERS (generally the result of negotiations between governments and public employee unions), average retirement ages will tend to increase somewhat in the coming decades…

Retiree Health Benefits. Many state and local governmental entities in California also provide health benefits to eligible retired employees and/or their spouses, registered domestic partners, dependents, and survivors of eligible retirees. Generally, public employers offering such benefits contribute a specific amount toward a retiree’s health premiums each month. The level of these benefits and the eligibility of groups of retirees to receive the benefits vary considerably among governmental entities. In January 2008, a state commission estimated that public entities in California—including those with employees in CalPERS and CalSTRS, as well as other governments—spent about $3.5 billion per year, as of that time, on retiree health benefits. (About 55 percent of those costs were attributable to the state government, CSU, school districts, and community college districts, with the rest attributable to other local governments and UC.) State costs for retiree health benefits have since increased about 50 percent above the level cited in the January 2008 commission report. Accordingly, we estimate that current statewide retiree health benefits expenses total around $5 billion annually for California governments, most of which is attributable to entities with employees in CalPERS and CalSTRS.

Legal Protections for Public Employee Pension Benefits. Article I, Section 10 of the

U.S. Constitution prohibits any state from passing a “law impairing the obligation of contracts.” The State Constitution also prohibits the state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. These clauses are known as the “Contract Clauses” of the U.S. and State Constitutions, respectively.

In various instances over the past century, California governments have made attempts to alter or reduce pension benefits for current and past employees and to reduce payments to pension systems. In a number of cases, California courts have held that such actions violated the Contract Clauses of the U.S. and/or State Constitutions. Courts have held that a public employee’s pension constitutes an element of their compensation, that a vested contractual rights to pension benefits accrues upon acceptance of employment, and that such a pension right may not be destroyed, once vested, without impairing a contractual obligation of the public employer. In general, California courts have declared that it is difficult to modify or alter public employee pension benefits to reduce governmental costs unless that change is accompanied by comparable new advantages for affected public employees and retirees.

Proposal

This measure provides that “no new memorandum of understanding or other contract or agreement” between any public agency and employees in CalPERS or CalSTRS may allow their retirement with “full retirement benefits” at an age younger than 65, except for sworn public safety officers, who would be able to receive full retirement benefits starting at age 58.

Significant Uncertainty About What This Measure Means. This measure raises several significant legal and implementation issues that make it uncertain as to how its provisions would be implemented. For example, it is unclear to us exactly what “full retirement age” would be construed to mean in practice. There are at least two possible interpretations of this provision. One interpretation would prevent service retirements (retirements not related to disability) by current public employees prior to age 65 (or age 58 for sworn public safety officers). A second interpretation would prevent pension benefits from reaching their maximum level until at least age 65 (or 58 for public safety officers). For example, many public safety officers now work under the 3 percent at 50 pension benefit formula, where they are able to retire at or after age 50 with an annual benefit equal to 3 percent of their “final compensation” multiplied by their number of years of service. (Therefore, an officer who worked for 30 years and retired at 50 could be eligible for a retirement benefit equal to 90 percent of his or her highest annual salary—3 percent of the highest year’s pay multiplied by 30.) Under this second interpretation of the measure, a government might be able to comply by reducing this pension benefit to 2.99 percent at 50, while allowing the retiree to work for eight more years and retire with a 3 percent at 58 benefit formula. If this second interpretation were adopted, the measure could result in only de minimis benefit changes for affected CalPERS and CalSTRS members.

The measure would be applied only to “new” MOUs negotiated with employee bargaining units. As described above, however, many pension contracts are not included in MOUs, but rather are derived from statutes, such as those in the Government Code or the Education Code. Moreover, managerial and supervisorial employees generally are not members of bargaining units and thus are not subject to any MOUs at all related to their current period of service. It is unclear to us whether the word “new” in this measure applies only to MOUs or whether it also applies to other pension contracts or agreements, such as those delineated in statute or those applicable to managers and supervisors. Courts could determine that this measure applies only to new MOUs or new pension contracts. For CalSTRS members, for example, this interpretation might mean that this measure has no substantive effect to the extent that current Education Code provisions related to the pension system are never changed in the future. There might, in other words, never be a new contract or agreement for CalSTRS members and some or all CalPERS members.

The measure does not address specifically how it would be applied to disability retirement benefits of the two pension systems. It also does not address specifically how or if it would be applied to current CalPERS and CalSTRS retirees.

Finally, as described above, a long history of case law makes clear that it is difficult to change pension benefits for current and past public employees without offering comparable new advantages. There are no apparent comparable new advantages provided to current and past public employees in CalPERS or CalSTRS who otherwise would be affected by this measure. Accordingly, litigation is likely that would seek to invalidate this measure’s provisions with regard to current and past public employees.

Fiscal Effects

This measure could result in major changes to how the state and some local governments compensate their employees. The fiscal effects of these changes would depend on how the measure is interpreted by the courts and the Legislature and implemented by both state and local governmental entities. In particular, if the courts determine that the measure’s increase in retirement ages would apply only to public employees hired after the date it is approved by voters, the full fiscal effects of the measure would not emerge until several decades after its passage. Below, we discuss the potential effects of this measure on state and local government costs in the short run (the next few years) and over the long run (perhaps 20 or more years in the future), respectively.

Short-Run Fiscal Effects

Significant Potential Cost Reductions if Applied to Existing and/or Past Employees. If the measure is allowed by the courts to be applied to existing and/or past public employees, it could result in substantial reductions in state and local government pension contributions beginning almost immediately—potentially amounting to billions of dollars per year. The most substantial decreases could result from lowered state and local pension contributions. This is because delaying public employees’ retirements by several years—assuming the measure prevents all service retirements until age 65 (or 58, for sworn public safety officers)—could perhaps result in substantially lowered costs for California governments. To the extent this measure delayed the retirement date of current employees, governmental payments for retiree health benefits also could be reduced in the short run. If, on the other hand, this measure is interpreted in a way that requires only de minimis changes of public employees’ pension benefits, it might result in minimal short-term savings.

Little Short-Run Savings if Applied Only to Future Public Employees. If courts do not allow this measure to be applied to existing and past public employees at all, it might result in little savings in the short run. While the measure might, in this case, tend to reduce significantly the required employer pension contributions for future public employees, such employees would be a relatively small portion of the workforce for most public agencies in the short run.

Increases in Other Compensation Costs. In order to offset the decreased retirement benefits resulting from this measure, governmental entities with employees enrolled in CalPERS and CalSTRS likely would increase other forms of compensation for some employees in order to remain competitive in the labor market. These other forms of compensation include salaries and contributions to employee retirement funds other than the defined benefit pension plans addressed by this measure. These cost increases would offset any short-term reductions in pension contributions described above to an unknown extent. The overall magnitude of these added costs would be determined by various factors, including labor market conditions and choices made by governmental entities.

Some Local Agencies Might Terminate Their Contracts With CalPERS. To avoid the limitations of this measure, local governments—following negotiations with public employee unions, in some cases—could choose to terminate their pension benefit contracts with CalPERS and instead provide pension benefits through another existing or newly established public retirement system. To the extent that local governments choose this option, the savings described above could be diminished, and in certain cases, taxpayer costs to service CalPERS’ unfunded liabilities might increase.

Bottom Line. In the short run, public employer defined benefit pension contributions and retiree health contributions could decline by billions of dollars per year if this measure’s limitations are interpreted to apply to current and/or past public employees in CalPERS and CalSTRS and to require significant reductions in benefits. These cost reductions, however, would be offset to an unknown extent by increases in other compensation costs for some public employees. If, on the other hand, this measure’s limitations on retirement ages are applied only to future employees and/or require only small changes in benefits, then there would be little short-term savings for public employers.

Long-Run Fiscal Effects

Significant Potential Cost Reductions in the Long Run. If the measure is interpreted to require significant benefit changes for future public employees, it could result in substantial reductions in state and local government pension contributions in the long run, potentially amounting to billions of dollars per year (in current dollars). As described above, the most substantial decreases could result from lowered state and local pension contributions. Governmental payments for retiree health benefits also could be reduced by billions of dollars per year (in current dollars). If, on other hand, this measure is interpreted in a way that requires only de minimis reductions of public employees’ benefits, it could result in minimal savings over the long run.

Increases in Other Compensation Costs. In order to offset the decreased retirement benefits resulting from this measure, governmental entities with employees enrolled in CalPERS and CalSTRS likely would increase other forms of compensation for some employees in order to remain competitive in the labor market, as described above. These cost increases would offset reductions in pension contributions described above to an unknown extent. Some local agencies still might terminate their contracts with CalPERS, as described above.

Bottom Line. In the long run, public employer defined benefit pension contributions and retiree health contributions could decline by billions of dollars per year if this measure’s limitations are interpreted to require significant reductions in benefits. These cost reductions, however, would be offset to an unknown extent by increases in other compensation costs for some public employees. If, on the other hand, this measure’s limitations on retirement ages are interpreted to require only small changes in benefits, then there might be little savings for public employers.

Fiscal Summary

This measure would have the following major fiscal effects on the state and local governments:

* In the long run, possible reductions in state and local pension and retiree health costs. The magnitude of the savings would depend on a variety of legal, implementation, and behavioral uncertainties and would be offset to an unknown extent by increases in other state and local employee compensation costs.

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Note: The text of the initiative is at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i956_11-0022_(raise_public_retirement_age).pdf

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For those who can’t get enough amateur efforts from the initiative procesas, let us present an alternative outlet:

Pension Tax?

An initiative was submitted in July to the Attorney General proposing to tax public pensions above $100,000. It applies only to CalPERS and CalSTRS and not UC. As noted in this blog, anyone can submit and initiative (anyone with $200). But as a practical matter, you need $1-$2 million to pay signature gathering firms if you want to get it on the ballot. And, if the measure is controversial, you may need tens of millions for TV ads, etc., thereafter for a campaign.

The submitter of this particular initiative is Lanny Ebenstein whose CV is at http://www.sbcta.org/lannyebenstein.html It seems unlikely he has a handy $1-$2 million, despite being treasurer of the Santa Barbara County Taxpayers Association. He also has some kind of affiliation as a lecturer with UC-Santa Barbara’s econ department so maybe that is why UC is omitted.

However, for your $200 investment, you get a title from the Attorney General and a fiscal analysis from the Legislative Analyst. Below is the Leg Analyst’s review of the proposed initiative. The analysis is significant because use of taxation might seem to be a way to circumvent the legal prohibition on changing pension benefits of retirees. Some future initiative might sweep UC into such an approach but the same legal analysis would apply.

The actual initiative is at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i954_11-0021_%28tax_public_pensions%29.pdf

Apart from pointing to some sloppy drafting, the Leg Analyst points to some legal problems in the tax-pensions approach. It italics below, it is noted that are problems in trying to tax pensions of non-residents. California pensioners may become non-residents if they move out of the state. (Of course, taxing their pensions would add to the incentive to move.) The Leg Analyst notes that there is a federal law that prohibits taxation of non-resident pensions.

What about resident pensions? The Leg Analyst is less sure of the legalities. The analysis is in bold italics below. Such a tax might be construed as a de facto reduction of pensions – which would be illegal. The Leg Analyst is also unsure about the implications of taxing some public pensions but not others.

Below is the Leg Analyst’s discussion:

August 19, 2011: Pursuant to Elections Code Section 9005, we have reviewed the proposed constitutional initiative regarding taxation of certain public sector pensions above $100,000 per year (A.G. File No. 110021).

Background

Public Employee Pensions in California

California Has Both Statewide and Local Public Pension Plans. The two largest entities managing state or local pension systems in California are the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). Combined, CalPERS and CalSTRS serve 3.1 million members (about 8 percent of California’s population), including around 750,000 members and beneficiaries who currently receive benefit payments. Members of CalPERS include current and past employees of state government and the California State University, as well as judges and classified public school employees. In addition, hundreds of local governmental entities (including some cities, counties, special districts, and county offices of education) choose to contract with CalPERS to provide pension benefits for their employees. Members of CalSTRS include current and past teachers and administrators of California’s public school and community college districts. Members of CalPERS and CalSTRS receive differing levels of pension benefits. Many CalPERS members also participate in the federal Social Security program; in general, CalSTRS members do not.

In addition to CalPERS and CalSTRS, about 80 other defined benefit state and local pension systems (such as the University of California Retirement System, the Los Angeles County Employees’ Retirement Association, and the Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System) serve about 1 million other Californians, including about 300,000 who currently receive benefit payments.

Defined Benefit Pensions. CalPERS and CalSTRS both provide “defined benefit” pensions, to their members. Defined benefit pensions provide a specific monthly benefit after retirement that is generally based on the employee’s age at retirement, years of service, salary at or near the end of his or her career, and type of work assignment. In general, both public employees and their employers (and, in the case of CalSTRS, the state government as well) contribute to public retirement systems to finance future pension benefits during the employees’ working years. Public pension systems invest these contributions to generate returns that, over time, pay for a significant portion of these pension benefits.

Pension Benefits Over $100,000 Per Year. A small percentage of CalPERS and CalSTRS retirees and beneficiaries currently receive pension benefits totaling over $100,000 per year. About 2 percent of CalPERS and CalSTRS retirees currently receive such payments. Payments to the retirees receiving over $100,000 of pension benefits per year now equal around 7 percent to 9 percent of total pension payments from the two systems. During their working lives, these retirees generally were among the longest-serving and highest-paid public employees—for example, senior executives and managers of some state and local agencies, school districts, and community colleges. The percentage of CalPERS and CalSTRS retirees that receive over $100,000 in annual pension benefits—as well as the percentage of the systems’ pension payments going to these retirees—likely will grow in the future for several reasons. These reasons include the effects of inflation (which will tend to increase all employees’ pay and pension benefits over time) and the effects of increased pension benefit provisions put in place about one decade ago for many current public employees.

Other Programs Administered by CalPERS and CalSTRS. In addition to their defined benefit pension programs, CalPERS and CalSTRS offer a number of other benefit programs for eligible public employees. CalPERS, for example, administers health plan benefits for the state and many other public agencies and offers tax-deferred retirement savings plans, including the Supplemental Income 457 Plan that employees of participating public agencies and schools can use to save money for retirement. The CalSTRS Pension2 program provides 403(b), 457, and Roth 403(b) savings plan services to school employees.

Taxation of Pension Income

California Residents Are Taxed by the State. In general, recipients of public employee pension benefits pay federal income taxes on those benefits. California residents also generally are subject to state income taxes on most income, including pension income received from California and out-of-state sources.

Federal Law Prevents California From Taxing Pension Income of Non-Residents. California requires nonresidents to pay income taxes on many types of income they received from California sources. Prior to 1996, for example, California taxed non-residents on pension income received from California sources. This became a source of controversy for some individuals who had earned pensions from employers in California and subsequently retired and moved out of state. (At the time, 15 other states had pension tax policies similar to California’s.) In response to requests from such retirees, Congress passed and President Clinton signed Public Law 10495, which prohibited, beginning in 1996, any state from imposing income taxes on pension income of a non-resident. In September 1996, Governor Wilson signed Chapter 506, Statutes of 1996 (AB 850, Morrissey), which inserted a similar provision in state law prohibiting California from taxing non-residents for pension income received from California sources. The prohibition of Chapter 506 (codified as Section 17952.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code) is in effect only so long as the federal prohibition in Public Law 10495 remains operative.

Limited or No Case Law on Taxes Focused on Select Groups of Public Sector Retirees. Decades of case law place substantial limits on the ability of California governments—and of voters through the initiative process—to reduce pension benefits of current and past public employees. Because public pension benefits generally represent contracts between governmental entities and the employees or retirees, the U.S. Constitution’s “contract clause” also limits the ability of governments and voters to alter pension benefits for current and past public employees. We are not aware, however, of any substantial case law on (1) whether California may institute taxes on public employee pension benefits specifically or (2) if so, whether pensions of only a few public pension systems (but not those of other pension systems) may be taxed.

Proposal

New State Tax on Certain CalPERS and CalSTRS Pension Income. This measure amends the State Constitution to institute a new state tax on pension benefits paid to an individual by CalPERS and/or CalSTRS that exceed $100,000 per year. Because the language is somewhat ambiguous and relies on undefined terms, it is not clear how this change would be implemented. Our best interpretation, however, is that this tax would be in addition to existing state income taxes and would be levied as follows:

*For individuals receiving CalPERS and/or CalSTRS benefit payments between $100,000 and $149,999 per year: an additional tax equal to 15 percent of the benefit payments over $100,000.

*For individuals receiving CalPERS and/or CalSTRS benefit payments above $150,000 per year: an additional tax equal to $7,500 plus an amount equal to 25 percent of the benefit payments over $150,000.

The measure specifies that the tax would apply to “all” public sector pensions paid by CalPERS and CalSTRS. Pensions paid to current and past public employees, therefore, are not excluded from the proposed new tax. The application of the tax to current and past public employees—and to members of just two pension systems, but not other pension systems—almost certainly would be subject to litigation.

Proposed Tax Not Indexed to Inflation. Unlike many other income taxes in existing law, the taxes established under this measure would not be indexed to inflation. In other words, the $100,000 constitutional threshold to begin paying the proposed tax would never be adjusted upward for inflation.

Uncertainties and Possible Litigation Concerning the Proposal. There are various uncertainties concerning this proposal. As noted above, the measure’s language is unclear as to exactly how the new tax would be implemented.

The measure does not exclude from its proposed tax the CalPERS and CalSTRS income received by residents of other states. It, therefore, would create a new state law that may be interpreted as applying a state income tax to non-residents. This provision almost certainly would be subject to litigation seeking to invalidate such a non-resident tax as prohibited by current federal law.

In addition, the measure specifies that the new tax would not be applied to benefits received from CalPERS and CalSTRS health benefit programs. It does not, however, specify whether the new tax would be applied to payments from the systems’ supplemental savings programs, including, but not limited to, CalPERS’ Supplemental Income 457 Plan and CalSTRS’ Pension2 program. For purposes of the fiscal analysis below, we assume that the measure does not apply a new tax to payments from these supplemental savings plans.

Fiscal Effects

Revenues

Initially, Potentially Higher Annual State Revenues of About $60 Million. As described above, there are various uncertainties concerning implementation of this proposal. Our best guess, however, is that if the proposed tax is able to be applied to all current and past public employees now receiving pension benefits from CalPERS and CalSTRS, it could generate about $60 million of additional annual state revenue in the short run. (Total estimated General Fund revenues are projected to be $88 billion in 201112.)

No Revenues in the Short Run if Tax Cannot Apply to Current Employees and Retirees. We assume that there would be a court challenge to this tax by current and past public employees. If courts ruled that the tax cannot be applied to these employees and retirees, this measure would produce no additional state revenues initially. In this case, a minor amount of state revenue related to future employees’ pensions would begin to be paid to the state about five years after passage, growing to the tens of millions of dollars per year during the first decades after passage.

In Longer Run, Could Grow to Be a Somewhat Larger Percentage of State Revenues. Over time, a growing percentage of CalPERS and CalSTRS members would become subject to the proposed new tax. This is because, over time, due to inflation and other factors, there will be a greater proportion of CalPERS and CalSTRS retirees receiving benefits of over $100,000 per year. Accordingly, the revenue from this new tax likely would grow to be a somewhat larger percentage of state General Fund revenues than initially. Many decades from now, assuming the continuation of current pension benefit provisions, it is likely that most CalPERS and CalSTRS beneficiaries will receive benefits of $100,000 or more as inflation expands their salaries.

Behavioral Changes by Retirees Could Reduce Revenue Gains. We are not aware of any other state that imposes a tax specifically targeted to public pensions, as envisioned by this measure. If courts determined that federal law bars California from taxing non-residents’ pension income, this measure would result in retirees receiving more than $100,000 in annual CalPERS and/or CalSTRS pension benefits having an incentive to leave the state. This incentive would increase as their income increases. Over time, as a greater percentage of CalPERS and CalSTRS retirees receive more than $100,000 in annual pension benefits, more and more retirees would have a financial incentive to leave California. The departure of some of these retirees from the state would diminish the revenue generated by the proposed tax and result in a loss of economic activity in California (and other state and local tax revenue associated with that activity). These factors could offset a substantial portion of the state revenue gain that otherwise would occur under this measure.

In Long Run, Behavioral Changes by Employers Could Reduce Gains. The effect of this measure would be that public employee pensions administered through CalPERS and CalSTRS would be less valuable to retired public employees. Over the long run, this would affect public employers’ compensation decisions in a variety of ways. Public employers—sometimes through negotiations with public employee unions—may make decisions to change the current mix of public employee total compensation, by devoting more compensation to non-pension items and less to pensions. Local agencies also could choose to terminate their existing pension benefit programs with CalPERS and instead ask other pension systems, such as the state’s county retirement systems, to administer pensions for them. The Legislature and/or local agencies also could establish new public pension systems, such as new pension systems for employees of state agencies and school districts that would not be subject to the proposed tax. These potential behavioral changes would tend to diminish or offset the revenue that otherwise would be generated by the proposed tax.

Other Fiscal Effects

Potentially Higher State Spending for Schools and Community Colleges. Proposition 98 was approved by voters in 1988. It establishes a minimum amount of annual state funding for

K-12 schools and community colleges. The funding formulae of Proposition 98 are complex, but, in some cases, when state General Fund revenues increase, the state’s minimum funding guarantee for schools also increases. Because this measure would increase General Fund revenues, it also could result in higher guaranteed state funding of school and community college districts under Proposition 98.

Higher State and Local Employee Compensation Costs. Public employers compete with each other and with private employers to hire qualified employees in the labor market. Because CalPERS and CalSTRS pension benefits would be less valuable to employees under this measure, public employers providing pension benefits through those two systems likely would need to increase other forms of compensation—including salaries, benefits, or contributions to other retirement funding plans—for some of their employees in order to continue to hire and retain a sufficient number of qualified personnel. These increased compensation costs are impossible to predict and would be determined in part through negotiations with public employee unions. In addition, the decisions of some public employers to exit CalPERS could result in some additional unfunded liabilities that may have to be funded in some way by future taxpayers. Combined, all of these higher public employee compensation costs eventually could offset a substantial portion of the revenue gain generated by the proposed new pension tax.

Fiscal Summary

This measure would have the following major fiscal effects on the state and local governments:

*Possible increase in state revenues from a new tax on certain public employee pensions. Over the long run, these revenue gains would be offset by decreases in other state and local revenues and increases in some state and local costs.

= = = =

Interesting how a tax is seen as a virtue by someone from a taxpayer group:

UC Pension Plan May Be Targeted Today

A group whose funding sources are cloudy – the California Foundation for Fiscal Responsibility – plans a grand unveiling today of a study on pension funding in California. The report below indicates it covers California’s 5 biggest pension funds. After CalPERS and CalSTRS, UCRP is the 3rd largest at the state level.

As numerous posts on this blog have indicated, ballot initiatives aimed at capping pensions could affect UC and override the Regents’ action on the UC pension taken last December. UC could be swept into some statewide initiative even if it is not a central target of the study.

From the LA Times 5-5-11:

Pension benefits for hundreds of thousands of state workers would be reduced 25% to 40% under two proposals that have become the focal points for what could become a costly and bruising ballot fight over retirement funding.

In a new financial analysis estimating the cutbacks, the nonprofit California Foundation for Fiscal Responsibility warned that rising costs of public employee pensions and retiree healthcare could overwhelm the ability of taxpayers to fund many basic health, welfare and public safety services.

“Public employees are getting far more benefits than those in the private sector,” said Marcia Fritz, the foundation’s president, adding that voters are “fed up.” “The upshot,” she said, “is going to be a huge fight” — an initiative contest that will be followed closely nationwide.

According to the study, to be released Thursday, California’s five biggest pension funds are in precarious financial conditions. Last year, they had only enough money to cover 61% to 74% of their obligations to current employees…

Full article at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pension-overhaul-20110505,0,7054972.story

On the funding of the group producing the study:

An unknown out-of-state foundation has become a substantial backer of an ambitious nonprofit group that is positioning itself at the center of the state’s debate over public pensions.

Democratic consultant Marcia Fritz, who runs the nonprofit Californians for Fiscal Responsibility, first mentioned at a San Francisco forum last month that the group had received a substantial contribution from an out-of-state foundation. She said the money will be used to research several competing pension plans that are being proposed this year…

Fritz confirmed to California Watch that she does not intend to reveal the identity of the anonymous donor but said the funding came from a foundation, not an individual, and that her group won it in open competition. The group plans to use the funding to present research reports and create Web-based tools evaluating the competing reform plans…

Full article at http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/secret-out-state-donor-powering-pension-reform-group-9534

Update: Public sector unions have mounted a reverse campaign on pensions, e.g., http://dontscapegoatus.com/ and http://www.sacbee.com/2011/05/05/3602892/state-worker-with-pensions-under.html

UC’s special needs can easily get lost in the cross-fire. UCOP and the Regents need to get involve sooner rather than later on this issue.

Further Update: calpensions.com reports the following on the soon-to-be-released study:

The study was done by Capital Matrix Consulting (Mike Genest, Brad Williams and Jay Peters) for the California Foundation for Fiscal Responsibility (Marcia Fritz) under a $150,000 grant from an undisclosed out-of-state source.

[Editor’s note: Genest was Finance Director under Gov. Schwarzenegger. Williams was with the Legislative Analyst’s Office.]

Full article at http://calpensions.com/2011/05/05/public-vs-private-pension-study-the-gap-widens/

Still Further Update: The official press release for the study oddly suggests interested to get in touch with the LAO. Below is the release text. Scroll down for the relevant text in bold:

Study Compares Public, Private Employee Compensation and Retirement Costs
May 5, 2011

FOR RELEASE: May 5, 2011

CONTACT: Marcia Fritz
916.966.9366 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 916.966.9366 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Marcia@FixPensionsFirst.com

Retirement Costs Inflate State, Local Budgets
CHP, Prison Guard Benefits Often Worth $2 Million per Officer
Teachers pay more for pensions, collect less than most public employee

SACRAMENTO – State and local government employees in California earn similar salaries as their counterparts in the private sector, but generous retirement benefits push total compensation costs significantly higher than what California’s largest companies spend, according to a study released today.

California’s largest employers typically spend less than one-third what state taxpayers spend on employee pensions and retiree health benefits. A state employee earning $60,000 annually will accumulate pension and retiree health benefits valued at $19,000 a year. A comparably paid employee of a large California company will receive retirement benefits worth less than $6,000.

California’s 2011-12 state budget includes $6 billion for the major state retirement plans. The study compares only the employers’ cost of benefits; it does not include the value of contributions employees make to their retirement plans.

“If taxpayers spent what California’s top companies spend on employee retirement benefits, the state would have $3 billion more this year for schools, public safety and other essential services,” said Marcia Fritz, CPA, president of California Foundation for Fiscal Responsibility, which sponsored the study. “The rationale for generous public pensions used to be that public employees accept lower salaries, but that doesn’t withstand scrutiny any longer.”

“Governments can’t manage their budgets when they can’t adjust wages and benefits to changing economic conditions,” said Michael Genest, former state finance director and principal of Capitol Matrix, which authored the study. “This is a fundamental public policy question that California must resolve to regain control of its financial future.”

State retirement benefits are generous, but they are far more generous for some employees. Prison guards and California Highway Patrol officers can retire seven years earlier than teachers with benefits that are 77 percent higher. Prison guards and CHP officers also collect larger benefits than FBI agents and other federal law enforcement officers. A 53 year-old California public safety employee with 26 years service and an annual salary of $140,000 will be entitled to retirement benefits valued at $2.2 million, according to the financial analysis. A federal agent’s benefits would be worth $1.6 million.

“Teachers’ retirement plans were designed for teachers who retire after 30 years in the classroom,” Fritz said. “Today’s teachers are more likely to work ten years and leave to start a family or a new career. Some enter the teaching profession in the middle or later stages of their careers. A teacher who spends eight years in the classroom at a young age leaves with retirement benefits that are worth less than the teachers’ own contributions to his/her own plan. In the same period, a comparably paid local government employee has accumulated benefits worth $58,000.”

Brad Williams, former chief economist for the Legislative Analysts’ Office and principal author of the report said, “Salaries and benefits paid to local government employees are generally higher than the salaries and benefits paid to state government and private sector employees. There is also a striking difference in the value of retirement benefits provided to career employees. A local government employee who begins a career at age 27 with a $45,000 starting salary and receives normal wage increases can retire at age 57 with retirement benefits totaling almost $1.2 million. A similarly situated teacher will receive $500,000 and an employee of a large corporation less than $400,000.”

“Pension reform doesn’t mean retirees must lose benefits. Public employees will always keep what they’ve earned,” Fritz said. “But reform is desperately needed to reverse the course that has produced pension debt our grandchildren’s grandchildren will be paying for. A state constitutional amendment aligning public and private retirement benefits will save billions of dollars now and into the foreseeable future.”

###

Reporters are invited to contact Jason Sisney, director of state finance at the Legislative Analysts’ Office, who was provided with an advance copy of the report. Call him at 916.319.8361 or email Jason.Sisney@lao.ca.gov

Please visit www.FixPensionsFirst.org for:
Capital Matrix Study
Slide presentation
Research team bios
Government, academic and private studies
Public opinion polls, local election results
Recent news
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Source: http://www.fixpensionsfirst.com/2011/05/study-compares-public-private-employee-compensation-and-retirement-costs/

More Update: A clarification regarding the LAO was subsequently sent out:

*** MEDIA ADVISORY ***
May 5, 2011 at Noon

Clarification: Questions from reporters suggest there may be confusion about CFFR’s recommendation to contact the LAO for a reaction to the report. CFFR did not mean to imply that the LAO played any role whatsoever in the development of the report. The LAO was provided with an advance copy in anticipation of media inquiries, and CFFR did not mean to imply any endorsement by the LAO of the report, its methodology
or its findings.

More Information: Visit www.FixPensionsFirst.org to find:

· Capitol Matrix financial analysis
. Today’s slide presentation
· Today’s news release
· Bios on the research team
· Government, academic, foundation studies on public pensions
· Latest news
· $100,000 Pension Club
· Latest pension reform proposals

Contact: Sarah@FixPensionsFirst.com
916.410.7506